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This study investigates the performances of growth and productivity in Syria for the period 1985-2008 
by means of growth accountings for the total economy and three major sectors, agriculture, industry, 
and services. Based on these analyses, guidelines for policies are suggested aiming at the targets for 
growth and employment as projected in the 11
th Five-Year Plan of the economy for the period 2011-
2015. The relative importance of the growth of physical capital and labour, of human capital and total 
factor productivity (TFP) is assessed. The study shows that much higher investments in physical and 
human capital per year are necessary than accomplished in the recent past in all sectors to achieve 
the  projected  growth  targets  of  the  Plan.  Particularly  in  the  industry  sector  negative  TFP  growth 
hampers growth of output and productivity in the global economy. Growth and reform policy should be 
focused in the planning period particularly on this sector in order to meet the requirements with respect 
to the growth and employment targets for the total economy in the Plan. 
 
 










                                                 
1  Prof.  Dr.  Hans  Joachim  Schalk,  Institut  für  Siedlungs-  und  Wohnungswesen,  Centrum  für 






In  2004  the  Syrian  government  launched  a  comprehensive  reform  of  its  economic  policy  with  the 
objective of transforming the national economy from a planned into a social market economy. By this 
reform the growing pressure of problems should be tackled resulting on the one hand from the high 
population  growth  rate  and  on  the  other  hand  from  the  slow  momentum  and  low  international 
competitiveness of Syria's economy. Furthermore, dwindling oil reserves had led to a drastic decline in 
revenues from oil exports. In April 2006, then, the 10
th Five-Year Plan (FYP) 2006-2010 in the form of 
a reform program was issued. 
The German “Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit”, GTZ (now Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit,  GIZ)  has  been  supporting  the  economic  reform  process  in  Syria  right  from  its 
inception by the project “Support for Economic Reform in Syria”. The project’s tasks were to give 
support to the Syrian government in the analyses of the current macroeconomic situation, forecast the 
prospective development of Syria over the five-year planning period, analyse the impacts of planned 
policies and economic policy reforms, and to advise the government on how economic policy could be 
planned to achieve the policy targets of the Plan.  
Within the framework of the GIZ-project this study investigates the medium- to long-run patterns of 
economic growth for Syria by means of “growth accounting” with data for the period 1985 to 2008. 
Growth accounting provides a method for the empirical analysis of economic growth of output and 
(labour)  productivity  by  decomposing  their  growth  rates  into  separate  major  sources  as  there  are 
physical and human capital and their efficient use in production (Total Factor Productivity). On base of 
this investigation the contributions of the various sources to growth and productivity are analyzed, the 
growth prospects as projected in the next (11
th) FYP 2011-2015 assessed, and conclusions drawn for 
economic (reform) policies with respect to the projected targets for growth and employment in the 
Plan.  
A preliminary version of the study was provided by the end of 2010 and the final report submitted just 
before  unrests  broke  out  in  Syria  in  mid-March.  In  the  wake  of  the  uprising  the  economic  reform 
process has stalled, its main architect, the Deputy Prime Minister for economic affairs, Abdullah al-
Dardari, was dismissed, and the German GIZ collaborators in the project left the country. While it is 
still too early to predict the outcome of the current political situation at the moment there is little to 
suggest that growth will be able to remain within its medium-term average around 8(!) per cent as 
projected in the 11
th FYP. To put it less euphemistically, if the protest movement cannot be stopped 
soon, a growth disaster similar to that Syria experienced in the 1980s in the wake of falling oil-prices 
and war will be the most likely outcome in the planning period. 
In contrast to these rather gloomy prospects the study paints a brighter picture of Syria’s economic 
growth and development for the coming 5 years. It is assumed that the reform process of the 2000s is 
continued and the unrests, which were unforeseeable at the time the study was drafted, do not occur. 
But even in this favourable scenario great efforts are necessary to reach the 8-percent growth rates 
over  the  planning  period,  which  is  mainly  required  to  struggle  the  high  un-  respectively 
underemployment in particular of the young labour force aged 25 years old and under. Thus, under 
consideration of the current events in the country, the (rhetorical) question suggests itself: quo vadis 
poor Syria? 
This study was produced on behalf of the GIZ under the invaluable support of the Program Director of 
the project “Support for Economic Reform in Syria”, Dr. Michael Krakowski. I would also like to thank 
Rabie Nasser and Fadlala Garzaldeen for discussions of methodological issues, Ramia Nasser for 






Achieving  faster  long-run  growth  is  of  particular  pressing  importance  to  Syrian  policy  makers.  To 
create enough jobs annually to match the people entering the labour market every year, to reduce 
unemployment,  to  struggle  poverty  respectively  to  improve  standard  of  living,  to  meet  the  rising 
investment needs for public infrastructure due to the high population growth, etc., Syria plans to boost 
real GDP growth to 8 percent by 2015.  
 
By definition, output is labour productivity (output per worker) multiplied by employment. Therefore, to 
achieve the 8 percent growth target and, once attained, to keep it at this level it is essential to direct 
economic activities to improve (labour) productivity and to generate the jobs (employment) for the 
growing  labour  force.  “A  Growth  Diagnostics  Report”  of  the World  Bank  in  cooperation  with  CEM 
estimates that annual growth rates of 8 percent requires 175000 jobs per year during the next 10 
years, which corresponds to an employment growth of 3.4 percent. Thus, to boost GDP growth to 8 
percent,  labour  productivity  must  grow  by  4.6  percent  annually,  a  three  times  higher  rate  than 
accomplished on average per year in the 2000s (1.6 percent per year). This raises the fundamental 
question: is the GDP growth target of 8 percent not a pipe dream, and attainable at all? 
 
Basically, yearly GDP growth rates of 6-8 percent are even over the long-run not impossible. Starting 
in the 1960’s and for over 30 years, growth rates of this order of magnitude were achieved by a group 
of four rapidly growing countries (Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea), called the New 
Industrialized Countries (NIC) or East Asian “tigers”. And more recently, since the 1990s, new “growth 
miracles” have emerged with China, India, Malaysia, Thailand, which are growing with even higher 
rates than the NICs. Thus, in principle, the 8 percent growth projection seems not to be an unrealistic 
goal for Syria. But it raises the obvious question of how Syria can do as good as or even better than 
most East Asian tigers so as to emerge as the new “Economic Tiger of the Middle East”? 
 
Improving the growth performance of output and productivity of Syria motivates, therefore, the overall 
objective of this study. Understanding the causes and sources of economic growth and determining 
what government policies can promote or retard economic growth is central to this goal. To this end, 
the study investigates the patterns of economic growth for Syria based, firstly, on aggregate growth 
accounting. The growth accounting framework provides a method for analysing economic growth of 
output  and  (labour)  productivity  by  decomposing  their  rates  into  separate  major  sources,  namely, 
contributions  from  physical  capital  and  labour  accumulation  respectively  increases  in  capital  per 
worker (capital intensity), improvements in educational attainments (human capital per worker), and in 
efficiency of resources use (Total Factor Productivity). The objective is to assess the contributions of 
the sources to growth and productivity and to draw conclusions for policy aimed at a better economic 
growth performance.  
 
However, such an analysis of the growth performance on the macroeconomic level may masks large 
and important differences in the growth patterns of output and productivity among economic sectors. 
For the economy as a whole negative and positive output and productivity growth among economic 
sectors may cancel out at the macroeconomic level. Thus it may turn out that a growth policy at the 
macro-level does not appear to be necessary while, nevertheless, a structural policy at the sectoral 
level can be essential. Therefore, secondly, separate accounts for three major economic sectors are 
performed in this study: Agriculture, Industry, and Services. These investigations may help to throw 
further light on the growth process and the factors that drive it and provide the basis for structural 
(sectoral) policies to promote growth in the total economy. 
 
Over the total period of observation underlying this study from 1986-2008 Syria reports strong average 
output growth of 4.1 percent per year but only a meagre 0.1 percent increase in output per worker (see 
for the figures the tables in the Annex, particularly Table 1 in the following). However, for the more 
recent years since 2000, as Syria intensified structural reforms, output per worker increased by 1.6 
percent per year, a significant improvement relative to the 1990s and late 1980s, for which little gains 4 
 
or even negative growth in productivity are registered. Capital per worker (capital intensity) growth 
contributed the first time positively to labour productivity growth in the 2000s. This positive contribution 
to growth can be traced back to two effects: on the one side physical capital increased by 5 percent 
yearly. These are growth rates Syria never experienced before. On the other side employment growth 
slumped from much higher rates than 4 percent in the years prior to 2000 to averaged 3 percent per 
year in the 2000s. Both effects together let capital intensity grow by roughly 2 percent annually so that 
capital  deepening  occurred  for  the  first  time  in  the  2000s.  Nevertheless,  capital  per  worker’s 
contribution  to  productivity  growth  has  been  modest  at  best  (1.1  percent  per  year)  before  the 
background of the required 4.6 percent, despite intensifying reforms in the 2000s, and particularly in 
comparison with that of fast growing countries in East Asia. 
 
The accumulation rate of physical capital, typically approximated by the investment share in GDP, the 
investment rate, averaged out a yearly 22 percent over the 2000s in Syria. However, such investment 
rates,  which  are  quite  “normal”  in  high-developed Western  countries,  are  too  low  in  Syria  for  two 
reasons. Firstly, they lead to capital accumulation too low to equip the exceptionally high growing 
working-age population with enough capital to absorb all new job seekers entering the Syrian labour 
market  each  year.  In  the  2000s  employment  grew  about  3  percent  per  year  but  the  working-age 
persons  by  4  percent.  Thus  a  yearly  widening  lack  of  jobs  arose.  Secondly,  enduring  labour 
productivity growth of 4.6 percent requires investment rates on a higher scale. If again the rapidly 
growing East-Asian countries are any guide, it appears that overall (public and private) investment 
rates of 30 percent or above are needed to achieve the required gains in labour productivity. China, for 
example,  registered  over  a  period  of  26  years,  from  1978-2004,  investment  rates  of  around  35 
percent.  This  led  to  capital  deepening,  which  accounted  for  3.2  percent  per  year  of  output  and 
productivity growth, about 3 times the amount estimated by the growth accounts for Syria in the 2000s. 
 
Therefore, policy should aim at investment rates of 30 percent and higher. According to the growth 
accounts performed for Syria such rates will provide the still fast growing working-age population with 
sufficient jobs and physical capital to give the economy for just an extended time impetus towards the 
desired 8 percent growth path.  
 
Besides this obvious under-capitalization, Syria reports in comparison to East Asian countries also a 
rising gap in human capital per worker. Education contributed to growth in those countries about 5 
times more each year than in Syria over the total period 1986-2008 (0.5 percent versus 0.1 percent). 
In the 1990s human capital’s contribution to growth was even zero, but then, in the 2000s, it increased 
to 0.2 percent yearly, at least. These differences are the result of the different investments in human 
capital, measured by average  years of schooling,  which are per  worker much higher in the Asian 
countries than in Syria. Thus, half a percentage point growth per year could be gained by drawing 
level with those countries in the improvement of educational attainments. Therefore, acceleration of 
the pace of improvements in educational attainment should obtain priority of Syrian’s economic policy 
for the next 10 years. 
 
As  for  TFP  growth,  the  estimated  rate  of  0.4  percent  averaged  over  the  entire  period  1986-2008 
appears to be rather low. However, leaving out the growth disaster of the 1980s to separate out the 
effects of the oil price slump, and averaging over the 17 years from 1991-2008 only, TFP growth is 
calculated as 0.9 percent. This figure might still deem to be too low, but it is in full line with the rate 
obtained for the NICs over a period of 23 years from 1980-2003. This is a remarkable result given that 
negative TFP growth  was most prevalent in Middle East and North  African countries still until the 
1990s. Because high frequency phenomena such as business cycles and other exogenous chocks 
are likely cancelling out each other over the 17 years, this TFP growth rate can be considered as 
primarily driven by innovation, knowledge, technology, and institutional reforms, factors that raise the 
economy’s efficiency in the longer run. Therefore, the growth rate which is suggestive of “technical 
progress” is about 1 percent for Syria presently. 
 
Besides  for  the  global  economy,  growth  accounts  have  been  performed  for  three  main  economic 
sectors:  Agriculture,  Industry,  and  Services.  The  empirical  results  revealed  indeed  that  the 5 
 
macroeconomic  growth  accounting  discussed  so  far  masks  large  and  important  differences  in  the 
growth patterns between the three sectoral aggregates. 
 
With respect to the agricultural sector productivity growth in the second half of the 1980s is highly 
negative (-5.5 percent per year), in the 1990s still negative but more moderate rates are registered on 
average  (-0.4  yearly),  but  then  for  the  2000s  labour  productivity  soars  to  whopping  8.3  percent 
compound annual growth rates. In the latter period capital deepening alone accounts a fully half, 4.3 
percentage points, to the increases in output per worker, an amount never before observed in Syria’s 
economy.  Nearly  another  half,  3.8  percentage  points,  comes  from  TFP  growth,  the  highest  rate 
measured in all growth accountings performed in this study for the 2000s. A remainder of 0.2 percent 
is  due  to  education.  However,  despite  the  exceptionally  high  productivity  growth,  averaged  output 
grew in the 2000s only 4.1 percent per year because of the tremendous dismantling of employment by 
4.2 percent each year in agriculture. 
 
This result has affected decisively the growth performance of the economy on the national level in the 
2000s. First, capital deepening which accounted remarkably for the soaring labour productivity growth 
did  not  occur  because  of  an  exceptionally  high  capital  accumulation  but  was  due  to  declining 
employment.  And  because  shed  agricultural  labour  could  not  fully  be  drawn  into  the  industry  and 
services  sectors,  total  employment  growth  in  the  economy  decelerated,  increasing  in  turn 
unemployment  in  the  economy.  Second,  without  the  extremely  high  capital  deepening  process  in 
agriculture the strong although less spectacular 1.1 percent contribution of capital per worker to labour 
productivity  growth  had  not  been  observed  at  the  macro-level.  Third,  it  can  be  ascribed  to  the 
exceptionally high gains in Total Factor Productivity in the 2000s, presumably due to investments into 
the modernisation of the agricultural production technology and more efficient use of labour that a 
positive though very moderate TFP growth was also obtained for the entire economy. In short: the 
agricultural sector was in the 2000s not only the major contributor to the increases of productivity at 
the national level and to positive TFP growth but also to the decrease of annual national employment 
growth of 1 percentage point below that of the work force. 
 
In contrast to the agricultural sector output and productivity growth deteriorated in the industry sector, 
in the 2000s even dramatically. Output growth slumped by 5.6 percentage points, from 7.7 percent in 
the 1990s to 2.1 percent in the 2000s, and because yearly employment growth has jumped after 1990 
to an average of 4.5 percent per year, productivity declined each year in the 2000s by 2.5 percent. 
Despite an acceleration of capital accumulation (jump of physical capital growth from 1.4 percent in 
the 1990s to 4.4 percent in the 2000s) capital per worker did nearly not change in the 2000s because 
labour (employment) increased by 4.6 percent per year at the same time. Therefore, capital deepening 
and a notable contribution of physical capital per worker to labour productivity growth could not be 
observed. As a result, negative productivity growth was dominated by changes in TFP, which declined 
by about the same amount (-2.5 percent) per year. 
 
This dramatic decline of TFP in the 2000s is the most striking pattern in the industrial sector’s growth 
accounting. Presumably, this is partly a reflection of the reduction of over-utilization of the production 
factors prevailing mainly in the late 1980s and still in the 1990s and of the decline in oil production in 
Syria since the 2000s. Hardly is it suggestive of technological change, unless one thought that much 
of the recent development in the industrial sector is technological regress, which is improbable. But for 
all that, the collapse of TFP growth in the 2000s is disappointing in the light of the on-going reform 
process, which is focused on the industrial sector. Particularly in the 2000s, when such reforms were 
implemented  with  increased  intensity,  improvements in  the  efficiency  of  production  and,  therefore, 
positive effects on TFP growth were expected. However, it might still be too early for these effects to 
be detected in the data used for the empirical growth accounting in this study.  
 
After less favourable growth performances in the late 1980s and the 1990s the growth account paints 
in the 2000s a brighter picture of the services sector’s growth pattern. Output grows at a very high rate 
of 6.8 percent annually, 2.7 percent higher than agriculture’s and 4.7 percent higher than industry’s 
output in the same period. As a result, and taking into consideration that services is the largest sector 6 
 
producing about 45 percent of total output, it accounts for more than half of the economy’s national 
growth. 
 
In contrast to output growth, labour productivity growth in services is relative weak (1.0 percent) in the 
2000s. This follows mainly from the fact that, as in industry alike, capital deepening did not occur, even 
though the sector reports the highest compound physical capital growth rate over the whole period. 
But  because  it  has  employed  at  least  part  of  the  large  pool  of  shed  workers  from  agriculture, 
additionally to a high share of yearly accruing working-age persons (more than 4 percent), capital 
intensity  has  not  changed  noteworthy  and,  consequently,  capital  per  worker’s  contribution  to 
productivity growth is insignificant. As human capital per worker’s contribution to output per worker 
growth is also negligible, TFP growth accounts for fully 90 percent of output per worker growth in 
services in the 2000s. One can presume that reforms have led to this pleasant result by reversing the 
negative TFP growth rates observed in the pre-periods. But before any definite conclusions in this 
respect can be drawn more and in-depth analyses are needed. 
 
Summarizing and concluding, the growth accounts performed in this study provide some confirming 
evidence of the role of various contributors to growth in Syria. They can be used as guidelines for a 
growth policy aiming to increase output growth from a level of 4.5 percent, accomplished in the 2000s 
on average per year, to 8 percent as planned for the next 10 years. The study shows, that this global 
target can basically be achieved, but to this end much higher investments in physical and human 
capital are necessary per year than accomplished in the recent past. Investments in physical capital of 
30 percent of GDP and higher are indispensable. Besides, much higher investments in human capital 
per worker (improvements in educational attainments) are necessary to boost its contribution to growth 
to a level as accomplished by the fast growing East Asian countries (5 times higher). Luckily, a yearly 
1 percent TFP growth coming like manna out of the blue sky can be booked on this back-of-the-
envelope calculation for the coming 10 years. 
 
A  sectoral  (structural)  growth  policy  can  contribute  significantly  to  the  macroeconomic  8  percent 
growth goal. In the industry sector the declining respectively stagnant rate of growth of capital per 
worker and negative growth rates are both responsible for high negative productivity growth in the 
2000s, despite relative high capital accumulation. This reflects the rapid growth of the work force in 
this sector. This trend, which is likely to continue in Syria, is particularly problematic. Higher amounts 
of new investments are necessary to equip the accruing work force with sufficient capital, particular in 
the industry sector. Higher investments and thus higher capital-embodied technical change, which is 
not explicitly allowed for in the growth accounting approach will eliminate at the same time negative 
TFP growth and stimulate additionally output and productivity growth. 
 
A similar rationale applies to the services sector. A higher equipment of labour with new capital to the 
tune of the national average in the 2000s (1.1 percent) would lift alone output growth to the 8 percent 
benchmark. To this adds an additional growth due to an increase of labour efficiency via TFP. 
 
The growth pattern of the agricultural sector in the 2000s is, because of high depletion of labour, most 
problematic.  High  TFP  growth  and  increases  in  the  capital  intensity  lead  to  strong  substitution  of 
labour by capital and raise productivity to an extremely high growth rate. More control of this process 
by policy is advisable because under- respectively unemployed workers are drawn out of agriculture 
into industry and services, which have to carry a heavy load with this dislocated labour. Such a policy 
would reduce capital per worker’s contribution to productivity growth in agriculture but must not be 













Achieving faster long-run growth is of particular pressing importance to Syrian policy makers. 
To create enough jobs annually to match the people entering the labour market every year 
(more than 3 percent of the labour force), to reduce unemployment (from a high of 10-12 
percent presently to 4 percent), to struggle poverty (according to UNDP 30 percent of the 
Syrian population lives in poverty and 11.4 percent below the subsistence level) respectively 
to improve standard of living, to meet the rising investment needs for public infrastructure 
due to the high population growth, etc., Syria plans to boost real GDP growth to 8 percent by 
2015 (ZAWYA, Feb 08, 2010 and Al-Ba’th, Syria, August 25 and 26, 2009).  
 
To achieve this growth rate and, once attained, to keep it at the high 8 percent level it is 
essential to direct economic activities to improve (labour) productivity and to generate the 
jobs (employment) for the growing labour force. By definition, output is labour productivity 
(output per worker) multiplied by employment. The latter grew in Syria with a high rate of 
about 2.9 percent per year over the period 2001-2008 while labour productivity increased by 
1.6 percent. This adds up to the average GDP growth rate of 4.5 percent actually observed 
per year in the 2000s. “A Growth Diagnostics Report” of the World Bank in cooperation with 
CEM estimates that annual growth rates of 8 percent requires 175000 jobs per year during 
the next 10 years, which corresponds to an employment growth of 3.4 percent. Thus, to 
boost GDP growth to 8 percent, labour productivity must grow by yearly 4.6 percent, a three 
times  higher  rate than accomplished  in  the  2000s. This raises  the question,  is the GDP 
growth target of 8 percent not a pipe dream and attainable at all? 
 
Basically, yearly GDP growth rates of 6-8 percent are even over the long-run not impossible. 
Starting in the 1960’s and for over 30 years, growth rates of this order of magnitude were 
achieved by a group of four rapidly growing countries (Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
South Korea), called the New Industrialized Countries (NIC) or East Asian “tigers”. And more 
recently, since the 1990s, new “growth miracles” have emerged with China, India, Malaysia, 
Thailand, which are growing with even higher rates than the NICs.
2 Thus, in principle, the 8 
percent growth projection seems not to be an unrealistic goal for Syria. Nevertheless, the 
fundamental question persists: given the projected employment growth of 3.4 percent, how to 
generate productivity growth of 4.6 percent yearly needed to hit the 8 percent output growth 
target? 
 
Most nations, and Syria as well, do not only care about absolute economic growth, but also 
about standard of living or prosperity respectively poverty, roughly gauged by real GDP per 
person  rather than  output  itself,  and  about  relative  growth,  that  is,  a  country’s  economic 
                                                 
2 Some of the ”tigers” had their heydays prior to the financial crisis of 1997-98. Though the Asian economies 
recovered quickly the growth rates from before the crisis were no more attained. 8 
 
growth performance relative to that of other countries. Even though Syria has been rather 
successful in increasing economic output at an average growth rate of 4.1 percent annually 
from 1986-2008 (the total period of observation in this study), its growth performance in 
GDP per head of population was with 1.4 percent yearly weak compared to rapidly growing 
East Asian countries. As a result, Syria did not catch up in living standard to the high levels 
enjoyed by people in Western industrial countries, nor did it keep pace with the NICs and the 
other tiger countries like India and China, which report growth rates for GDP per person of 
2.5 percent and much higher.
3  
 
If Syria had experienced already in the past 10 years an annual output growth as planned for 
the future, output per capita would have grown by 5.2 percent per year, the country had 
outperformed all tiger countries in this period except for China, and its standard of living ha d 
been in 2010 by a tremendous factor of 1.7 higher than in 2000. Regarding the 8 percent 
growth target this raises the obvious question of how Syria can do even better than the most 
East Asian tigers and emerge as the first “Economic Tiger of the Middle East”?  
 
Improving the growth performance of output and productivity of Syria and the living standard 
of  its  citizens  motivates,  therefore,  the  overall  objective  of  this  study.  Understanding  the 
causes  and  sources  of  economic  growth  and  determining  what  government  policies  can 
promote or retard economic growth is central to this goal. To this end, the study investigates 
the  patterns  of  economic  growth  for  Syria  by  constructing,  firstly,  aggregate  “growth 
accounts”.  The  growth  accounting  framework  provides  a  method  for  analysing  economic 
growth  by  decomposing  its  rate  into  separate  major  sources,  namely,  contributions  from 
physical  capital  and  labour  accumulation,  educational  attainment,  and  improvements  in 
efficiency  of  resources  use  (total  factor  productivity).  The  objective  is  to  assess  the 
contributions of the sources to growth and to draw conclusions for policy aimed at a better 
economic growth performance and an improvement in productivity.  
 
However, this analysis of growth performance on the macroeconomic level may masks large 
and important differences in the growth patterns of output and productivity among economic 
sectors. For the economy as a whole negative and positive output and productivity growth 
among economic sectors can cancel out at the macroeconomic level. Thus it may turn out 
that a growth policy at the macro-level does not appear to be necessary while, nevertheless, 
a  structural  policy  at  the  sectoral  level  can  be  essential.  Therefore,  in  addition  to  the 
aggregate growth accounting, secondly, separate accounts for three major economic sectors 
are  performed  in  this  study:  agriculture,  industry,  and  services.  These  investigations  for 
sectors may help to throw further light on the growth process and the factors that drive it and 
provide the basis for structural (sectoral) policies to promote growth in the total economy. 
 
Thus,  this  study  comprises  three  remaining  sections.  The  second  section  presents  the 
theoretical background of the growth accounting framework as a method of analysing the 
                                                 
3 See figures in Table 1 in Bosworth, Collins (2008). 9 
 
contribution of the sources to economic growth and productivity. The third section is devoted 
to  the  empirical  analysis  and  comprises  a  description  of  the  data  used  and  the  results 
obtained of growth accountings for the aggregate economy of Syria and three major sectors. 
Section four presents conclusions. 
2. Theoretical background and methodology 
 
Growth  accounting  is  a  method  used  to  analyse  how  economic  growth  depends  on  the 
growth in factor inputs and the improvements in the overall efficiency with which the factor 
inputs are combined or the level of technology, also called Total Factor Productivity. This 
method allows assessing the relative importance of the measurable factors of production for 
output growth and to derive measures for the empirically not observable growth of Total 
Factor Productivity. In this way the analysis provides the base for the planning of a policy 
targeted to enhance output, productivity, and technology.  
 
Besides some general background characteristics, a host of specific factors determines a 
country’s levels and rates of growth of output. Among those, major contributions to growth 
are expected from four groups of factors: (1) the quantity of physical capital, (2) the quantity 
of labour, (3) the equipment of labour with human capital, that is the knowledge and skills 
that workers acquire through education and on-the-job training, and finally (4) Total Factor 
Productivity. 
 
For quantitative growth accounting a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns 
to scale is assumed, where output Y is produced according to 
 




H denotes human capital, K the stock of physical capital and TFP is Total Factor Productivity. 
The parameters α and (1-α) are the partial elasticity of output with respect to H respectively K 
and measure the relative importance of human and physical capital in producing a unit of 
output. 
 
The inclusion of human capital into the production function to reflect changes in the quality of 
labour has become standard in growth theory. Human capital is defined as: 
 
(2)        H = e
λSL, 
 
where  L  is  the  number  of  workers  (employment),  which  is  adjusted  for  improvements  in 
educational attainment assuming that each year of schooling (education), S, raises average 
workers efficiency (productivity) by a constant proportional rate, λ, the rate of return to an 
additional year of schooling. In other words: the term e
λS in (2) is an index for human capital 
per  worker,  H/L=h,  and  shows  the  factor  by  which  efficiency  of  uneducated  labour  gets 
multiplied due to S years of schooling. Thus H can also be considered as a skill-adjusted 10 
 
measure of labour input or as educated workers that are like extra quantities of uneducated 
workers.
4 
By setting H=hL, the production function (1) can be rewritten as, 
 




For growth accounting analyses the production function (3), which is a relation between the 




(4)        gY = (gh+gL) + (1-)gK + gTFP, 
 
where g denotes the growth rate of the subscript variables of the production function. This 
form indicates that output growth, gY, equals the growth rates of human capital subdivided 
into  education  per  worker,  gh,  and  total  number  of  workers,  gL,  and  physical  capital,  gK, 
weighted by their output elasticities, α respectively (1-α), plus the growth rate of Total Factor 
Productivity, gTFP. To put it differently, output growth is accounted for by the contribution from 
increases in education per worker, gh, the growth of workers, gL, and physical capital, (1-
) gK, and from improvements in Total Factor Productivity, gTFP. While the production factors 
h, L, and K contribute a less than proportional amount to output growth (because  is less 
than 1 and due to diminishing returns to scale) the elasticity of output with respect to TFP 
equals 1, which means, that any TFP growth generates a proportional increase in production. 
 
An alternative way of writing the growth accounting framework is to express the production 
function in per worker terms by dividing both sides in (3) through labour, L. The growth rate 
form of this formulation is obtained by subtracting off in the growth accounting equation (4) 
the growth rate of labour, gL, from both sides: 
 
(5)        gY - gL = gh + (1-)(gK - gL) + gTFP 
 
This expression decomposes the growth of labour productivity (the growth rate  of output 
minus the growth rate of labour) into three terms: the first term, gh, is again the contribution 
of human capital per worker (contribution of education) to increased labour productivity, the 
                                                 
4 For example: Assuming a seven percent rate of return to education (λ=0.07) workers with no schooling (S=0) 
are efficient or represent a productivity of e
0.07*0=1. Then, according to (2) human capital H equals L. One year 
of schooling raises the level of human capital to H=e
0.07*1L=1.07L. Two years of schooling increases the level of 
human capital to H=e
0.07*2L=1.15L, etc. Thus each additional year of schooling raises workers’ efficiency by the 
constant proportional rate λ=0.07 and human capital is growing at this rate. 
5 Technically equation (4) is obtained by taking the natural logarithm and total differentiation of equation (3). 
Note that the differential of the log of a variable is approximately equal to its growth rate. 
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second  term,  (1-)(gK-gL),  gives  the  contribution  of  physical  capital  per  worker,  capital 
deepening, and the third term that of Total Factor  Productivity, gTFP, to growth of labour 
productivity.  This form of  the growth  accounting  is  more  useful  if  one  is  focused  on the 
growth of standard of living, typically measured by GDP per head of population, which is, at 
least in the longer term, closely related to output per worker respectively labour productivity.
6 
Moreover,  for  int ernational  comparisons and sectoral  analyses the  appropriate form of 
growth accounting is where output and physical capital are measured in per worker terms. 
 
TFP growth is in growth accounting perceived as that portion of output growth, which is left 
unaccounted for by growth in the production factor inputs. To put it differently, the growth rate 
of TFP is the difference between the growth rate of output and the weighted average of the 
rate of change of human and physical capital. By slightly rearranging e quation (4) an 
expression for gTFP is obtained as: 
 
(6)        gTFP = gY – [(gh + gL) + (1-)gK] 
 
According to this equation, the unobservable growth rate of TFP, gTFP, is a “residual”, which 
can be computed from the other variables on the right-hand side of (6) (output and inputs of 
human and physical capital), which are observable as well as an estimate for the partial 
output elasticity of labour, . 
 
TFP is supposed to represent “technology” and estimates of growth in TFP is sometimes set 
equal  to  “technological  progress”.  However,  calculated  as  a  residual  once  the  weighted 
contributions of changes in human and physical capital inputs have been accounted for, TFP 
growth includes much more than what is suggested by technological progress. It is not just 
new  knowledge  about  production  methods,  new  ways  of  constructing  building,  newly-
invented machines, and new sources of power, for which TFP growth is used as a measure 
of technological progress. But other non-technology factors will also be picked up by the 
residual. Such factors include changes in infrastructure, work organisation, the degree of 
monopoly in the economy, trade openness, changes in government policies and institutions 
(policy  reforms),  property  rights  and  economic  regime,  and  in  the  sectoral  economic 
structure.  Factors  like  political  turmoil,  financial  economic  and  oil  price  crises,  business 
cycles,  cultural  attitudes  toward  entrepreneurship  and  work,  external  shocks,  and  even 
weather shocks can also affect measured TFP growth. And because it captures anything that 
affects the relationship between measured inputs and output, TFP growth estimates are also 
affected  by  the  assumptions  and  errors  concerning  the  measurement  of  the  parameters 
(partial output elasticities) as well as of the variables of the production function (output and 
factor inputs). Thus, TFP growth includes much more than what is suggested by the word 
“technological progress”. Therefore, because it reflects the impacts of all sources of growth 
other than the contributions of the inputs human and physical capital, TFP and its growth are 
                                                 
6 In the short term this relationship might be weak but over longer periods of time of 20 years and more, on 
which growth accounting should in fact be focused, the correlation between the growth in labour productivity 
and the growth of real per capita output is robust and very high. 12 
 
best interpreted more generally as a measure of gains (and losses) in the efficiency with 
which these factor inputs are used. 
 
 
3. Empirical analyses 
 
3.1 The data 
 
Using the theoretical framework described in the preceding section, a set of growth accounts 
is  performed,  for  the  total  economy  and,  a  novelty  for  Syria,  for  three  major  economic 
sectors: agriculture, industry, and services.
7 Basically, growth accounting is a method for 
analysing long-term growth and, as a result, requires time series data for many years. To 
make sure that short-term phenomena like, for example, business cycles are not affecting 
the outcomes, the data set should cover at least ten years, and more likely 20 years. For this 
investigation time series data for 24 years (1985-2008) could be collected. This data set 
spans a long enough period, that it can be used to address the interesting long-term growth 
performance of Syria. 
 
Because  much  of  the  controversy  over  the  relative  contribution  to  output  growth  from 
increases in factor inputs versus TFP growth results from differences in the measurement of 
output and the factor inputs, the construction of the data basis for the growth accounting 
model  described  in  the  preceding  section  will  be  discussed  briefly.  Time  series  data  is 
required for the three major economic sectors on output, Y, human and physical capital, H 
and K, and labour and investment, L and I, the latters in order to construct the human and 




The  Central  Bureau  of  Statistics  (CBS)  provides  GDP  data  for  several  main  economic 
sectors and for a long time period beginning in 1963. In most empirical growth accounts GDP 
is used as the representative variable for output. However, in case of Syria GDP is not an 
appropriate  variable  to  measure  output  of  the  industry  sector.  This  is  due  to  high 
subsidization of production prices in this sector which implicates low or even negative GDP 
values in all years of the observation period. Therefore, in this study output is measured by 
“Value Added” in constant 2000 SP prices, which is readily available for Syria and the three 




For the purpose of this investigation an indicator for human capital was developed according 
to the methodology described in the preceding section. The functional form of human capital 
                                                 
7 The sectoral grouping follows that traditionally used by UN, World Bank, and other international organisations. 
“Agriculture”  includes  forestry  and  fishing,  “Industry”  comprises  manufacturing,  mining,  construction,  and 
electricity, water, and “Services” cover the remainder of the economy. 13 
 
augmented labour has been assumed in equation (2) as H=e
λSL. Thus to construct H, data 
for average years of schooling, S, Labour, L, and an estimate for λ, the rate of return for 
schooling,  are  required.  A  time  series  for  S  was  calculated  using  estimates  for  the 
educational attainment for the Syrian population aged 15 and above from Barro and Lee.
8 
Since it is not possible to distinguish differential levels of education across sectors for the 
Syrian economy, a common index to all three sectors is applied.  
 
Labour input is based on employment data for the total economy taken from the World Bank 
data set. These figures were allocated among the sectors: agriculture, industry, and services 
by means of employment shares on total employment for these sectors, which are also 
obtainable from the World Bank data set. Total employment and shares are available back to 
1985 only, for which reason this study has to be restricted to the time period 1985-2008  
 
As for λ a huge number of empirical studies for countries around the world has established 
that each year of schooling tends to raise a worker’s efficiency between 5 to 12 percent, on 
average.
9 In constructing the index as in equation (2), a 7 percent rate of return for each year 
of schooling is assumed.
10 This assumption is consistent with estimates for several other 
(developing) countries (Bosworth, Collins, Virmani, 2006), and also used in the growth 
accounting analyses conducted for China and India (Bosworth, Collins, 2008), which will be 




There is no official time series on the physical capital stock for Syria, neither for the total 
economy much less for any of the economic sectors. Therefore, own estimates for the value 
of the capital stocks for each of the three selected sectors were generated by the perpetual 
inventory method. For this purpose in the first step initial values of the capital stocks for 1963 
were estimated for each sector by the formula: 
 
(7)        K(1963) = I(1963)/(+g). 
 
I is investments measured by gross fixed capital formation in constant 2000 SP prices, which 
is  available  for  the  sectors  from  the  national  account  statistics  of  Syria  as  time  series 
extending  back  to  1963.    represent  the  sectoral  physical  capital  depreciation  rates 
calculated by multiplying the national depreciation rate, estimated by Zaman (2006) as 6.4 
percent,  with  the  sectoral  depreciation  to  value-added  ratios  from  national  accounts.  As 
results 3.5 percent for agriculture, 10.7 for industry, and 4.7 for services were obtained. g is 
                                                 
8 The Barro, Lee (2010) paper and the accompanying “New Data Set of Educational Attainment in the World, 
1950-2010” are available at www.barrolee.com. 
9 The numbers vary depending on the quality of schooling, the type of education, etc. See for empirical studies 
Bosworth, Collins, and Virmani, 2007. 
10 Thus, for Syria in 2010 with an average level of educational attainment around 5 years, effective labour 
(human capital) corresponds to e
0.07*5=1.4 times the number of employed workers. 
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calculated as the average geometric growth rates of investments over the years 1963 to 
1973: 15.5 percent for agriculture, 3.2 percent for industry, and 4.7 percent for services. 
 
In a second step, physical capital stocks for the subsequent years until 2008 were calculated 
according to the equation: 
 
(8)        K(t) = (1-)K(t-1) + I(t), 
 
Output elasticity of labour 
 
The  value  for  the  output  elasticity  of  labour,  α,  plays  a  key  role  in  determining  the 
contributions  of  human  and  physical  capital  and  TFP  to  growth.  In  empirical  growth 
accountings for national economies it is often approximated by the labour share in aggregate 
output, and calibrated from  national accounts data  in the range between 0.6  and 0.7  as 
suggested by the national income accounts data of industrial countries.
11  However, such 
estimates are problematic for Syria because of two reasons: First, the assumption implied 
with these estimates that employees are paid according to their marginal productivity is not 
very realistic for Syria (and for most developing countries). Second, because of the high 
share  of  self -employed  persons  in  total  employment  in  Syria  (and  other  developing 
countries), national account statistics do not comprise all labour income. Self -employed 
persons earn income from both capital and their own labour. This makes it difficult to obtain 
meaningful results for the labour share in national output and thus reliable estimates for the 
output elasticity of labour, α.
12 
 
Notwithstanding these caveats, there are two studies for Syria, which provide estimates of α 
based  on  national  account  data:  Nasser  estimates  α  with  data  from  1992-2002  by  the 
average share of labour in total income as 0.48, Zaman (2006) calculates an estimate by 
dividing the “productive” labour income through total national income minus state salaries 
and obtains a value of 0.44. 
 
To escape the shortcomings of the usual calibration methods α can be derived, instead, from 
econometrically estimated production functions. Thus, a recent study for 10 MENA (Middle 
East  and  North  Africa)  countries  revealed  by  estimation  of  Cobb-Douglas  production 
functions a labour share of 0.45 on average.
13 In another study of Senhadji (1999) an equal 
value of 0.45 was found by the same methodology for countries in the Middle East (Syria 
                                                 
11 The labour income share can be calculated, for example, from national accounts statistic as the compensation 
of employees over GDP at factor cost. Hall and Jones (1999) assume a value of α=2/3 for all 127 countries in 
their data set used for growth accounts, several of them counted as developing countries. Similarly, Bosworth 
and Collins (2003) set α equal to 0.65 for the entire sample of 84 countries, among them 22 industrial countries 
and  the  remainder  developing  countries.  Syria  is  not  included  in  either  of  the  two  growth  accounting 
investigations. 
12 Even if this reasoning is not valid for Syria the described method cannot be applied to the major s ectors of the 
study, because the requisite data does not exist. 
13 See Abu-Quarn, A. S. and S. Abu -Bader (2005). The 10 MENA countries comprise: Algeria, Egypt, Iran, 
Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey. 15 
 
excluded). But also for industrial countries and countries of the “whole” world (66 countries) 
Senhadji obtained elasticities in the order of 0.46 and 0.45, respectively.  
 
Common to all of these estimates is that they are significantly lower than the values in the 
typical range of 0.6 to 0.7 used in several growth accounting exercises in the literature. Given 
the values of α from the production function estimations and the above discussed reasons 
against its calibration from national accounts data for, in particular, developing countries, an 
output elasticity of labour of 0.44 is used in this study as national benchmark based on which 
values for the three selected sectors are estimated. For this to achieve it is assumed that the 
output  elasticity  of  labour  is  proportionate  to  labour  productivity.  The  sectoral  shares  in 
national  labour  productivity  are  then  used  to  apportion  the  aggregate  output  elasticity  of 
labour to the three selected sectors. The results are: 0.47 for agriculture, 0.41 for industry, 
and 0.46 for services. 
 
 
3.2 Empirical results 
 
The  empirical  results  of  the  growth  accounts  are  shown  in  Table  1  below  for  the  total 
economy of Syria and disaggregated by three major sectors. The table reports the results for 
the entire time period 1986-2008 and three sub-periods 1986-1990, 1991-2000, and 2001-
2008 separately. Results are presented in the following for the total economy and then for 
three  major  sectors:  Agriculture,  the  “primary  sector”,  which  also  includes  forestry  and 
fishing, Industry, the “secondary sector”, which is composed of manufacturing, construction, 
and utilities, and Services or “tertiary sector”, which covers the remainder of the economy. 
 
 
3.2.1 Macroeconomic analysis 
 
Consider first the results for the total economy and the entire time period 1986-2008 at the 
bottom of the table. As shown in the first column of Table 1 Syria’s annual output growth 
averaged notably 4.1 percent during the entire period. This growth is attributable in nearly 
equal amounts to increases in physical capital (1.9 percent) and labour (1.8), a meagre 0.1 
percent to human capital per worker (education), and 0.4 percent to gains in Total Factor 
Productivity.  Thus, most  of  the  output growth  during the  entire  period  is  associated  with 
increases in factor inputs of physical capital and labour, both together contributing to output 
growth a share of 88 percent, a small part is associated with TFP growth (a share of 9.5 
percent), and a marginal amount is attributed to education (a share of 2.5 percent). 
 
As  noted  earlier,  growth  accounting  is  not  only  focused  on  output  growth  but  also,  and 
primarily, on growth of output per worker (labour productivity) because this is closely related 
to output (income) per capita, which in turn is regarded as an indicator of living standards.
14 
                                                 
14 See also footnote 5. 16 
 
As  shown  in  the  second  column  of Table  1,  Syria  experienced  a  very  high  employment 
growth of 4 percent per year over the full period.
15 However, due to output growth to the tune 
of  employment growth, labour productivity growth remained anaemic, increasing by an 
average of only 0.1 percent per year (column 3 in the table). 
 
Thus, to achieve notable increases in output per worker and living standards in Syria, given 
its high labour force and population growth, much higher contributions of their determinants, 
physical and human capital per worker and TFP growth, are required than those attained 
during 1986-2008. Columns 6-8 in Table 1 show the sources of the disappointing growth 
performance in output per worker over the whole period: improvements in the quality of 
labour measured by education contributed along with TFP growth a small positive amount of 
0.5 percent. But this was nearly thwarted by the  negative contribution of capital per worker 
growth  of  -0.4  percent,  which  was  due  to  the  low  accumulation  of  capital  relatively  to 
employment over the entire period. 
 
The rate of physical capital accumulation, typically approximated by the investment share in 
GDP, the investment rate, averaged out a yearly 21 percent over the full period. However, for 
Syria such an investment rate is too low to equip the exceptionally high growing working age 
population  with  enough  capital  to  bring  about  capital  deepening.  To  achieve  capital 
deepening, the physical capital stock must grow more than employment. In contrast, over the 
entire time period capital grew in each year 0.7 percentage points  less than labour. This 
issue can be put another way: in the face of a growing labour force a fraction out of GDP 
must each year go only to keep the average amount of capital per worker in the economy 
constant.  However,  investment  per  worker  was  too  low  to  equip  the  large  amount  of 
additional entrants to the labour market each year with enough capital in order to maintain 
the average capital intensity, let alone to increase it.  
 
Therefore, strong, enduring labour productivity growth requires higher rates of investment 
than Syria attained in the past. If the fast-growing Asian countries are any guide, it appears 
that  overall  (public  and  private)  investment  rates  of  25  percent  or  above  are  needed  to 
achieve  notable  gains  in  labour  productivity. The  NICs, for  example, experienced  over  a 
period of 23 years, from 1980-2003, investment rates between 25 and 30 percent. In this 
period  increases  in capital  per  worker  contributed  2.2  percent  per  year  to  an  output  per 
worker growth of 3.7 percent.
16 Because the labour force grows in Syria much higher than in 
most Asian countries even higher investment rates are necessary to achieve such a result. 
 
                                                 
15 In the longer-term and at the level of the total economy employment growth is largely determined from the 
supply side by increases in the “labour force”, which comprises everyone of working-age who is a participating 
worker, that is people actively employed or looking for work (but who are not employed). In fact, over the 
period  1986-2008,  the  labour  force  grew  at  a  (slightly)  higher  rate  on  average  than  employment  so  that 
unemployment respectively “underemployment” must have increased over the observation period. 
16 See Bosworth, Collins (2008), Table 1 for this result. Another example is China, which realised over 26 years 
(from 1978-2004) even higher investment rates of around 35 percent. This led to capital per worker growth, 
which contributed 3.2 percent per year to an output per worker growth of 7.3 percent (see ibid. Table 1).  17 
 
The data in the table paint rather different pictures for the three separate time periods. The 
figures show that the relative low TFP growth observed for the entire period is solely due to 
its deterioration in the second half of the 1980s (-1.5 percent per year).
17 Because capital per 
worker  contributed  also  negatively  ( -2.1  percent  per  year),  labour  productivity  growth 
experienced a sharp fall of 3.3 percent annually, which was slowed down only slightly by the 
small positive contribution of educational attainment (0.3 percent). As a result, in 1990 output 
per worker was 20 percent lower than in 1985.  
 
Output growth itself was mainly driven by labour (2.1 percent contribution), which grew 
during this sub-period with 4.7 percent per annum. Together with smaller contributions from 
physical capital and education, the negative TFP growth effect could be overcompensated, 
so that output grew with a humble positive 1.5 percent rate annually during the late 1980s. 
However, as for the negative TFP contri bution to growth in this period half there are some 
doubts, if this was due to a genuine shift of technical progress based on deterioration in the 
technology of production in Syria. It might more likely be the outcome of a less efficient 
usage of the exist ing capital stock and the labour force triggered by a downturn of the 
economy Syria experienced in those years due to disruptions caused by wars, political 
unrests in the region, and deteriorating oil prices in the 1980s. This suggestion will find some 
empirical evidence in the results gained from the growth accounting for economic sectors 
discussed below. 
 
Between  the  second  half  of  the  1980s  and  the  1990s  output  growth  accelerated 
overwhelmingly by 3.7 percentage points (from 1.5 percent to 5.2 percent). Then, it settled in 
the 2000s at a slightly lower rate of 4.5 percent. Even on a per labour basis economic growth 
experienced in the 1990s an astonishing revival. Labour productivity growth accelerated 
between the late 1980s and 1990s even more than output growth by 3.9 percentage points, 
from -3.3 percent to 0.6 percent per annum. And although output growth declined between 
the second and third sub-period, the slowdown in the employment growth in the 2000s meant 
that labour productivity growth accelerated  again after 2000 by a full 1 percentage point. 




The remaining columns 4-8 in Table 1 show how the production inputs and TFP contributed 
to output and labour produ ctivity growth over  time. Columns 4 and 5 show that capital’s 
contribution  to  output  growth  increased  while  that  of  labour  declined  between  the  sub-
periods.  However,  the  contributions  to  output  growth  from  both  factor  inputs  together 
increased continuously from 2.7 percent before1991, over 3.8 percent in the 1990s to 4.1 
                                                 
17 Other studies found also negative or rather low TFP growth rates for Syria respectively for countries of the 
Arab world in the 1980s (and 1990s). See ESCWA (2007), and there Table 5 for an overview. Bosworth, Collins 
(2003), Senhadji (1999), Dasgupta, Keller, and Srinivasan (2002) report also very low or negative TFP growth 
for the Middle East and MENA countries in the 1980s and 1990s.  
18 If employment had grown with the labour force  rate of 3.9 percent in the 2000s, no acceleration of labour 
productivity growth would have been observed at all. This indicates a strong increase in the under -utilisation of 
the working age population of 1 percent per annum in the 2000s. 18 
 
percent after 2000. But it was not until the 2000s that a process of capital deepening gained 
momentum and capital per worker contributed the first time positively with 1.1 percent per 
year to output per worker growth. But because this capital deepening was partly due to a 
decline of employment growth rather than an increase in capital growth alone, output grew by 
about 0.7 percentage points less in the 2000s than it would have grown if employment had 
increased as in the 1990s.
19 
 
Improvements in the quality of workers measured by education play nearly no role in the 
acceleration of economic growth between the late 1980s and 1990s
20  while TFP growth 
increased considerably by 2.9 percentage points from -1.5 to 1.4 percent. However, this leap 
in TFP growth was unsustainable because it was not due to a genuine shift of technical 
progress based on improvements in technology. Rather it was presumably the outcome of a 
more efficient usage of the exist ing capital stock and the labour force triggered by the 
upsurge most economies in the Middle East experienced in the 1990s after the growth 
disaster in the 1980s when oil prices collapsed, and due to transitory demand -side effects. 
Syria, in particular, benefited in this period additionally from both, increased oil production 
and agricultural performance, as well as a windfall gain during the Gulf war, which allowed it 
to undertake key growth -enhancing infrastructure investments, such as the purchase of 
power stations and a telephone network. After these output effects had faded away, TFP 




This TFP growth in the 2000s might be considered as rather low giv en the economic policy 
reforms beginning with the 10
th Five-Year Plan. One of the premises of such reforms is that it 
would be expected to foster the overall efficiency of the economy, TFP, and thus output and 
productivity growth. However, although nobody doubts that there are impacts of economic 
policy  reforms  on  growth,  it  is  uncertain  if  they  are  affecting  TFP  growth  at  the 
macroeconomic level significantly.
22 With respect to Syria, in particular, it is argued that the 
actual implementation of the various components of the “declared” reform programmes and 
projects  is  proceeding  very  slowly  or  even  stagnating.
23  Besides,  some  of  the  reform 
elements do not affect TFP at all but rather the amounts of physical and human capital 
inputs. Hence, TFP might grow slower in dependence of reforms than expected. 
                                                 
19 The subsequent growth accounts for sectors will show that this decline in total employment growth was 
evoked by labour shedding in the agricultural sector. 
20 The main reason for the meagre contribution of human capital per worker to growth is because years of 
schooling per worker increased only marginally over the entire observation period. For the 1990s no increase at 
all is reported for Syria in the Barro, Lee (2010) dataset  on average per year, so a contribution of education to 
growth could not be identified in this period. 
21 If human capital per worker is excluded from the growth accounting framework a TFP growth value of 0.5 
percent is obtained for the 2000s as well as for the entire 1986 -2008 time period (sum of numbers in columns 7 
and 8). A simple unweighted average of TFP growth across studies for Syria listed in Table 5 of ESCWA (2007) 
yields 0.08 percent. (all studies exclude years after 2000). Nasser obtained with a different approach and data for 
1965-2004 a rate of 0.44 percent TFP growth for Syria.  
22 In literature there are only a few investigations concerning the relationship between TFP  and reforms; see for 
example Dasgupta, Keller, and Srinivasan (2001). The results are very ambiguous. 
23 Chahoud (2010) is elaborating throughout her study on this view of economic reforms in Syria. 19 
 
In addition, high TFP growth is not a necessary condition for the achievement of excellent 
growth performance of output and productivity. Thus, the fast growth of both output and 
productivity some East Asian economies experienced has been mainly based on significant 
capital deepening and rapid increases in educational attainment rather than exceptional high 
TFP growth. In the NICs, for example, physical and human capital per worker contributed 2 
respectively 2.5 times more to labour productivity growth over the period 1980-2003 than in 
Syria during its “heydays” in the 2000s.
24  
 
From these comparisons following preliminary conclusion for policy can be drawn: if Syria is 
out to enhance its growth in output and productivity and to catch-up in income per capita it 
should first and foremost try to draw level with rapidly growing Asian countries in physical 
and  human  capital  per  worker  growth  instead  of  hoping  on  high  TFP  gains  coming  like 
manna out of the blue sky. 
 
 
3.2.2 Analyses for economic sectors 
 
The results for economic sectors, depicted in Table 1, reveal that a macroeconomic growth 
accounting,  as  performed  so far,  inevitably  masks  large  and  important differences  in the 
growth patterns among sectors. For the economy as a whole negative and positive output 
and productivity growth among economic sectors can cancel out at the macroeconomic level. 
Thus it may turn out that a growth policy at the macro-level does not appear to be necessary 




Syria’s economy is heavily dependent on agriculture. Over the whole period 1985-2008 the 
sector produced 24 percent of total output and employed 25 percent of the work force on 
average per year. But its share in total employment declined in the 2000s continuously from 
a high of 33 percent in 2000 to a low 19 percent in 2008 whereas the output share remained 
rather constant at the 24 percent level. 
 
The  growth  account  for  the  agricultural  sector  is  shown  in  the  upper  panel  of  Table  1. 
Leaving aside the growth disaster period of the 1980s, output has grown in agriculture at a 
very  rapid  pace,  6.0  percent  per  year  in  the  1990s  and  a  lower  but  still  impressive  4.1 
percent in the 2000s. For the entire period 1985-2008 an average of 4.1 percent per year 
was achieved.  
 
The  growth  patterns  changed  strikingly  between  the  1990s  and  the  2000s.  While  in  the 
1990s output and employment grew both with high rates of 6 respectively 6.4 percent, in the 
                                                 
24 Compare for this the results in Table 1 of this study with those in Table 1 in Bosworth, Collins (2008). 
Comparability is by far guaranteed because both studies are based on similar methodologies. China, however, 
stands also out for the sheer magnitude of its gains in TFP growth. 20 
 
2000s output growth occurred at a still very strong 4.1 percent but against the backdrop of 
declining employment in the sector. During the 1990s output growth is completely driven by 
physical capital and labour (education and TFP show both no contribution to growth), in the 
2000s it is concentrated in improvements of TFP and the contributions of factor inputs cancel 
each other out. While in the 1990s output per worker growth hardly exists, in the 2000s it is a 
whopping 8.3 percent per year. Capital deepening contributes a fully half (4.3 percentage 
points)  to  the  increases  in  output  per  worker  in  the  2000s  and  nearly  another  half  (3.8 
percentage points) comes from TFP growth (and a negligible 0.2 percent from education). 
 
This striking change of the growth pattern in the 2000s deserves some more discussion 
because  it  seems  to  have  affected  decisively  the  growth  performance  of  the  aggregate 
economy. First, capital deepening, which accounted remarkably for the soaring output per 
worker growth, did not occur because of an exceptional high capital accumulation (which in 
fact decelerated slightly across the 1990 period) but was rather due to declining employment. 
And because shed agricultural labour could not fully be drawn into the industry and services 
sectors, aggregate employment growth decelerated (which in turn increased unemployment 
in the economy). Second, without the extremely high capital deepening process in agriculture 
the strong although less spectacular 1.1 percent contribution of capital per worker to labour 
productivity growth had not been observed at the macro-level. Third, it can be ascribed to the 
exceptionally  high  gains  in  Total  Factor  Productivity  in  the  2000s,  presumably  due  to 
investments  into  the  modernisation  of  the  agricultural  production  technology  and  more 
efficient use of labour that a positive though very moderate TFP growth was also obtained for 
the  entire  economy.  In  a  nutshell:  the  agricultural  sector  was  in  the  2000s  the  major 
contributor not only to the national productivity and TFP growth but also to the decrease in 




The industrial sector produced 32 percent of total output (value added) on average per year 
over the period 1985-2008 (31 percent in 2008) and employed 29 percent (30 percent in 
2008) of all employees.  
 
To begin, a comparison of the figures in the second panel of Table 1 with those for the total 
economy at the bottom of the table shows that the growth disaster in MENA countries in the 
1980s, the “lost  decade  of growth”,  hit  Syria’s  industrial  sector  most  and  differently  than 
forecasted for the aggregate economy. Since international oil prices collapsed, it is argued, 
there was a significant effort on the part of oil-producers to prop up oil prices by reducing 
production.
25 However, the empirical data in the table do not support this view: in contrast to 
the total economy, industrial output grew a whopping 9.1 percent per year, the highest figure 
for output growth in Table 1. And because employment increased only sluggishly ou tput per 
worker growth was also extremely high (8.4 percent).  
                                                 
25 See Dasgupta, Keller, Srivinasan (2002, 19). 21 
 
 
On the factor input side, investments in industry collapsed totally so that physical capital 
experienced  a  dramatic  decline  in  accumulation  in  the  1980s.
  26  As  a  result,  the  sector 
contributed  along  with  labour  negatively  to  output  growth,  despite  the  slight  increase  in 
labour input. Since capital per worker contributed also negatively to output per worker growth 
all increases in output and improvements in labour productivity have to be traced back to the 
“residual”. This is a whopping 9.2 percent TFP growth rate, the only positive value for the 
1980s and the highest rate at all registered for TFP growth in the table. Of course this high 
measure cannot be equated with technological progress or alike but it rather reflects the 
degree to which over-utilisation of the factor inputs prevailed in this period.  
 
In the following two periods, output and productivity growth deteriorated, in the 2000s even 
dramatically.  In  contrast,  in  the  agricultural  and  services  sector  as  well  as  in  the  total 
economy  they  ameliorated.  Output  growth  slumped  by  5.6  percentage  points,  from  7.7 
percent in the 1990s to 2.1 percent in the 2000s, and because yearly employment growth 
has jumped after 1990 to an average of 4.5 percent per year, output per worker declined 
each year by 2.5 percent. 
 
According to the growth accounting equation for the 2000s a yearly output growth of 4.6 
percent can be calculated, which is implied by the growth of physical capital (2.6 percent) 
and labour (1.9 percent). However, actual output grew only by 2.1 percent, i.e. 2.5 percent 
less than the implied growth. This difference is reflected in a negative TFP growth by about 
the same amount
27. As for the yearly output per worker growth a similar reason ing applies. 
Despite high capital accumulation capital per worker did nearly not change in the 2000s. 
Therefore, a notable contribution of physical capital per worker to labour productivity growth 
could not be observed.
28 As a result, negative output per wo rker growth was dominated by 
changes in TFP, which declined by about the same amount per year. 
 
This dramatic decline of TFP in the 2000s is the most striking pattern in the industrial sector’s 
growth accounting. Presumably, this is partly a reflection of the reduction of over-utilization of 
the production factors prevailing mainly in the late 1980s and still in the 1990s and of the 
decline in oil production in Syria since the 2000s. Hardly is it suggestive of technological 
change, unless one thought that much of the recent development in the industrial sector is 
technological regress, which is improbable. But for all that, the collapse of TFP growth in the 
2000s is disappointing in the light of the on-going reform process, which is focused on the 
industrial  sector.  Particularly  in  the  2000s,  when  such  reforms  were  implemented  with 
increased  intensity,  improvements  in  the  efficiency  of  production  and,  therefore,  positive 
effects on TFP growth were expected. However, it might still be too early for these effects to 
be detected in the data used for the empirical growth accounting in this study.  
                                                 
26 Gross investment was too low to make up for depreciation in this period. The increase in employment was too 
low to offset the negative effect of capital on output growth. 
27 The minor contribution of education to growth is ignored in this calculation. 






Services is the largest sector of Syria’s economy, producing 44 percent of total value added 
over the period 1985-2008 on average (46 percent in 2008) and employing 46 percent of all 
employees (52 percent in 2008).  
 
The  third  panel  summarizes  the  growth  performances  of  the  sector.  The  results  for  the 
second half of the 1980s show that the period of growth disaster hit services most: it reports 
negative  annual  output  growth  rates,  which  along  with  high  employment  growth  of  6.6 
percent per year (roughly comparable to that for the agricultural sector in this period) led to 
the sharpest slump in labour productivity growth. These yearly losses in output per worker 
are attributed for a smaller part to negative contributions of capital per worker and for the 
most part to the huge negative TFP growth, averaging nearly 6 percent annually. Of course, 
as  in  case  of  agriculture,  this  negative  TFP  growth  should  not  be  misunderstood  as 
technological regress but rather interpreted as a growing inefficiency of production due to the 
under-utilization of factor inputs in the 1980s. 
 
In the following decade and in the 2000s the sector witnessed a remarkable rebound of 
output growth, which accelerated from -1.7 percent in the 1980s over 2.8 in the 1990s to 6.8 
percent  in  the  2000s,  thus  by  8.5  percentage  points.  This  growth  was  so  strong  that 
increases in output per worker accelerated even more, by 9.3 percentage points, reversing 
the minus 8.3 percent in the period 1986-1990 to a plus of 1.0 percent in the 2000s. Albeit 
not high, the growth on a per-worker base is particularly impressive because it occurred 
against the background of a similar high employment growth as reported for the late 1980s. 
 
The sector achieved its gains in growth mainly through both substantial increases in capital 
accumulation  and  TFP  growth.  The  contribution  of  physical  capital  to  output  growth 
accelerated by 2.3 percent and that of TFP switched from a negative 5.8 percent in the 
1980s to a positive 0.9 percent in the 2000s, a swing or turnaround of nearly 7 percentage 
points. The acceleration of output per worker growth has come to 72 percent alone from this 
dramatic turnaround in TFP growth and the remainder from the increase in the contribution of 
capital per worker growth, which was a huge negative 2.8 percent per year in the late 1980s 
and diminished to a small negative 0.1 percent in the 2000s. 
 
Thus, for the more recent period the data in the table paint a brighter picture of the growth 
pattern for the services sector than in the two previous periods. Output grows in the 2000s 
very high at a steady 6.8 percent annually, 2.7 percent higher than agriculture’s and 4.7 
percent higher than industry’s output. As a result, the services sector accounts for most of 
the  growth  in  the  economy’s  total  output.  Capital  and  labour  contribute  roughly  equal 
amounts,  both factors  together  85  percent  to output growth.  Compared  to  output growth 
improvement  in  labour  productivity  is  weak,  but  for  the  first  time  a  positive  number  (1.0 23 
 
percent) at least. Because capital per worker has not changed noteworthy and human capital 
per worker’s contribution is negligible TFP growth accounts for fully 90 percent of output per 
worker growth in the 2000s. One can presume that reforms have led to this pleasant result 
by reversing the negative TFP growth rates observed in the pre-periods.  But  before any 
definite conclusions in this respect can be drawn more and in-depth analyses are needed, 
which would go beyond the purpose of this investigation. 
 
 
4. Summary and conclusions 
 
Summarizing and concluding, the growth accounts performed in this study provide some 
confirming evidence of the role of various contributors to growth in Syria. They can be used 
as  guidelines for  a growth  policy  aiming  to  increase growth from  a  level  of  4.5  percent, 
accomplished in the 2000s on average per year, to 8 percent as planned for the next 10 
years. The study shows, that this global target can basically be achieved, but to this end 
much  higher  investments  in  physical  and  human  capital  are  necessary  per  year  than 
accomplished in the recent past. Investments in physical capital of 30 percent of GDP and 
higher are indispensable. According to the growth accounts performed for Syria such rates 
provide the still fast growing working-age population with sufficient jobs and physical capital 
to give the economy for just an extended time impetus towards the desired 8 percent growth 
path.  Besides,  much  higher  investments  in  human  capital  per  worker  (improvements  in 
educational  attainments)  are  necessary  to  boost  its  contribution  to  growth  to  a  level  as 
accomplished by the fast growing East Asian countries (5 times higher). Luckily, a yearly 1 
percent TFP growth coming like manna out of the blue sky can be booked on this back-of-
the-envelope calculation for the coming 10 years. 
 
A  sectoral  (structural)  growth  policy  can  contribute  significantly  to  the  macroeconomic  8 
percent growth goal. In the industry sector the declining respectively stagnant rate of growth 
of  capital  per  worker  and  negative  growth  rates  are  both  responsible  for  high  negative 
productivity growth in the 2000s, despite relative high capital accumulation. This reflects the 
rapid growth of the work force in this sector. This trend, which is likely to continue in Syria, is 
particularly  problematic.  Higher  amounts  of  new  investments  are  necessary  to  equip  the 
accruing work force with sufficient capital particular in the industry sector. Higher investments 
and thus higher capital-embodied technical change, which is not explicitly allowed for in the 
growth  accounting  approach  will  eliminate  at  the  same  time  negative  TFP  growth  and 
stimulate additionally output and productivity growth. 
 
A similar rationale applies to the services sector. A higher equipment of labour with new 
capital to the tune of the national average in the 2000s (1.1 percent) would lift alone output 
growth to the 8 percent benchmark. To this adds an additional growth due to an increase of 
labour efficiency via TFP. 
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The growth pattern of the agricultural sector in the 2000s is, because of high depletion of 
labour, most problematic. High TFP growth and increases in the capital intensity lead to 
strong substitution of labour by capital and raise productivity to an extremely high growth 
rate.  More  control  of  this  process  by  policy  is  advisable  because  under-  respectively 
unemployed workers are drawn out of agriculture into industry and services, which have to 
carry a heavy load with this dislocation of labour. Such a policy would reduce capital per 
worker’s  contribution  to  productivity  growth  in  agriculture  but  must  not  be  detrimental  to 
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                 Table 1:           Sources of Growth in Syria, 1986 - 2008 
 
 
                                - Annual percentage rate of change - 
                              
     
                         Contribution of    
     
Output/ 




   Output  Employment  Worker  Capital  Labour  Worker  Education  Productivity 
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
                  Agriculture 
                1986 - 1990  0,5  6,0  -5,5  3,9  2,8  0,8  0,3  -6,6 
1991 - 2000  6,0  6,4  -0,4  2,9  3,0  -0,4  0,0  0,0 
2001 - 2008  4,1  -4,2  8,3  2,1  -2,0  4,3  0,2  3,8 
1986 - 2008  4,1  2,6  1,5  2,9  1,2  1,5  0,1  -0,1 
                  Industry 
                1986 - 1990  9,1  0,7  8,4  -0,7  0,3  -1,2  0,3  9,2 
1991 - 2000  7,7  4,5  3,2  0,8  1,9  -1,8  0,0  5,0 
2001 - 2008  2,1  4,6  -2,5  2,6  1,9  -0,1  0,2  -2,5 
1986 - 2008  6,0  3,7  2,3  1,1  1,5  -1,1  0,1  3,3 
                  Services 
                1986 - 1990  -1,7  6,6  -8,3  0,8  3,0  -2,8  0,3  -5,8 
1991 - 2000  2,8  3,3  -0,5  2,0  1,5  0,2  0,0  -0,7 
2001 - 2008  6,8  5,8  1,0  3,1  2,7  -0,1  0,2  0,9 
1986 - 2008  3,2  4,9  -1,7  2,1  2,2  -0,5  0,1  -1,2 
                  Total Economy 
                1986 - 1990  1,5  4,7  -3,3  0,6  2,1  -2,1  0,3  -1,5 
1991 - 2000  5,2  4,5  0,6  1,8  2,0  -0,8  0,0  1,4 
2001 - 2008  4,5  2,9  1,6  2,8  1,3  1,1  0,2  0,3 
1986 - 2008  4,1  4,0  0,1  1,9  1,8  -0,4  0,1  0,4 
 
Sources: Author's estimates as described in text. 
Methodology: The growth accounting approach is based on a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant 
returns to scale, in which output (Y) is a function of human capital (H), physical capital (K), and total factor 
productivity (TFP). Human capital is defined as H=hL, where h is human capital per worker, designated as 
education in the following, and L denotes the number of workers. Then, the production function can be written 
as: Y= (hL)
 K
(1-) TFP.  is a measure of the output elasticity of labour and assumed equal 0.47 for Agriculture, 
0.41 for Industry, and 0.46 for the Service Sectors. The results are reported in the table in two forms. One form 
decomposes the growth of output (gY) into the contributions of growth in education (gh), total number of workers 
(gL), capital (gK), and the contribution of improvements in Total Factor Productivity (gTFP): gY = (gh+gL) + (1-
)gK + gTFP, where g designates the growth rate of the subscript variable. In the table the figures in columns 
“Capital”, “Labour”, “Education”, and “Total Factor Productivity” represent the contributions of growth in these 
variables  to  output  growth  shown  in  column  “Output”.  The  other  form  decomposes  the  growth  of  labour 
productivity into the contributions of growth in capital per worker, education, and in TFP: gY-gL = gh + (1-
)(gK - gL) + gTFP. The figures in columns “Capital per Worker”, “Education”, and “Total Factor Productivity” 







                                                    Table 2: Data Total Economy 
                        
 
GDP  Employment  Labour Force  Investment  Physical Capital  Human Capital 
Year  2000 pr, Mill SP  in 1000  in 1000  2000 pr, Mill SP  2000 pr, Mill SP  in 1ooo 
1985  520209,8  2365,7  2571  169375,6  1261984,5  3165,4 
1986  494481,8  2478,3  2694  149861,2  1320153,4  3339,4 
1987  503914,2  2595,2  2821  101196,4  1326541,2  3521,7 
1988  570764,9  2718,0  2954  97562,9  1329289,9  3714,5 
1989  519634,6  2849,0  3097  88910,0  1323719,3  3921,0 
1990  559338,7  2995,9  3256  99515,4  1330395,2  4152,3 
1991  589508,9  3181,0  3428  103129,1  1341418,6  4402,0 
1992  658001,1  3339,9  3613  137376,9  1387118,5  4614,5 
1993  688386,2  3523,4  3816  138966,3  1432744,8  4860,3 
1994  726120,8  3704,8  4021  168069,1  1505278,0  5102,4 
1995  766307,6  3917,5  4243  167904,7  1572781,1  5386,7 
1996  821238,5  3766,5  4373  167389,4  1635602,9  5185,3 
1997  832198,8  3547,2  4505  158764,0  1685882,4  4889,3 
1998  893860,0  3898,0  4641  163962,7  1738271,0  5379,2 
1999  870292,0  4293,2  4792  159816,7  1783507,0  5931,5 
2000  938458,0  4712,7  4932  156093,0  1822642,2  6518,8 
2001  966433,0  4669,2  5077  170189,0  1874328,7  6475,4 
2002  998396,0  5002,7  5247  197330,0  1949918,4  6955,8 
2003  999005,0  4843,3  5424  231944,0  2056581,3  6751,5 
2004  1094398,0  5090,7  5691  255768,0  2180640,4  7114,6 
2005  1155016,0  5339,7  5986  288195,0  2329605,5  7481,9 
2006  1234080,0  5558,6  6229  308670,0  2489599,2  7838,8 
2007  1320898,6  5750,3  6487  283098,0  2613485,1  8161,5 
2008  1350471,8  5965,6  6733  266486,0  2712533,3  8521,7 
Sources:  World  Bank  data  set  and  Centre  of  Statiscal  Office  Syria.  Physical  and  Human  Capital  author’s 





















                                                    Table 3: Data Agriculture 
 
           
 
Value added  Employment  Investment  Physical Capital  Human Capital 
Year  2000 pr, Mill SP  in 1000  2000 pr, Mill SP  2000 pr, Mill SP  in 1ooo 
1985  119993,1  608,0  22115,2  134988,0  813,5 
1986  127737,0  641,9  20828,6  151032,5  864,9 
1987  109933,5  677,3  11357,5  157037,3  919,2 
1988  145196,9  714,8  14071,0  165542,7  976,9 
1989  101694,9  755,0  19783,1  179458,8  1039,1 
1990  122934,0  820,9  22712,8  195811,5  1137,7 
1991  131249,8  897,1  22013,6  210885,3  1241,4 
1992  154765,2  992,0  24385,1  227796,5  1370,5 
1993  154528,8  1095,8  22425,0  242148,1  1511,5 
1994  163972,5  866,9  23077,9  256644,1  1194,0 
1995  170687,7  1113,7  25131,5  272679,9  1531,4 
1996  195608,6  870,1  24922,1  287938,0  1197,8 
1997  189954,5  631,4  24986,9  302720,2  870,3 
1998  232289,3  888,8  24295,9  316287,4  1226,5 
1999  197229,0  1195,9  22204,4  327282,3  1652,3 
2000  222886,0  1552,0  24431,0  340114,1  2146,8 
2001  246104,0  1430,2  18866,0  346926,2  1983,4 
2002  265338,0  1562,4  32279,0  366909,8  2172,4 
2003  251568,0  1309,0  30173,0  384079,2  1824,7 
2004  247305,0  952,0  37218,0  407685,1  1330,4 
2005  273024,0  1074,4  40571,0  433807,4  1505,4 
2006  301080,0  1089,5  34634,0  453066,9  1536,4 
2007  291569,6  1098,3  26260,0  463269,8  1558,9 
2008  309063,8  1109,6  21879,0  468730,1  1585,0 
Sources: World Bank data set and Centre of Statiscal Office Syria. Physical and Human Capital  





















                                                    Table 4: Data Industry 
 
           
 
Value added  Employment  Investment  Physical Capital  Human Capital 
Year  2000 pr, Mill SP  in 1000  2000 pr, Mill SP  2000 pr, Mill SP  in 1ooo 
1985  104853,3  757,0  76448,3  567263,0  1012,9 
1986  93109,5  763,3  70133,6  576770,8  1028,5 
1987  97576,8  770,8  57884,5  573013,4  1045,9 
1988  123591,5  763,8  55151,0  566924,0  1043,8 
1989  144373,3  777,8  40243,3  546577,7  1070,4 
1990  165166,6  784,9  44078,2  532240,8  1087,9 
1991  177602,9  795,3  43984,5  519342,5  1100,5 
1992  195310,2  861,7  50699,1  514537,3  1190,5 
1993  217499,5  937,2  58639,4  518185,9  1292,8 
1994  227601,8  1159,6  82531,3  545336,5  1597,1 
1995  259735,2  1196,0  77993,6  565047,6  1644,6 
1996  309498,0  1201,5  79459,5  584118,1  1654,1 
1997  351123,1  1177,7  77431,1  599122,0  1623,2 
1998  362441,4  1200,6  75760,6  610851,9  1656,8 
1999  349543,0  1217,4  71620,0  617187,6  1682,0 
2000  356084,0  1231,2  63539,0  614765,1  1703,1 
2001  356682,0  1224,6  80544,0  629606,6  1698,2 
2002  347309,0  1387,1  70986,0  633303,9  1928,7 
2003  354526,0  1241,1  94673,0  660293,0  1730,1 
2004  384247,0  1674,8  103406,0  693130,7  2340,7 
2005  388604,0  1480,6  120013,0  739065,9  2074,6 
2006  399890,0  1573,1  133145,0  793223,8  2218,4 
2007  430554,8  1673,3  126934,0  835382,6  2375,0 
2008  420780,6  1777,8  126634,0  872735,7  2539,5 
Sources: World Bank data set and Centre of Statiscal Office Syria. Physical and Human Capital  





















                                                    Table 5: Data Services 
 
           
 
Value added  Employment  Investment  Physical Capital  Human Capital 
Year  2000 pr, Mill SP  in 1000  2000 pr, Mill SP  2000 pr, Mill SP  in 1ooo 
1985  295363,4  1000,7  70812,0  559733,4  1339,0 
1986  273635,3  1073,1  58899,0  592350,1  1446,0 
1987  296404,0  1147,1  31954,4  596490,6  1556,6 
1988  301976,6  1239,4  28340,9  596823,1  1693,8 
1989  273566,5  1316,2  28883,6  597682,8  1811,5 
1990  271238,1  1390,1  32724,4  602342,9  1926,7 
1991  280656,2  1488,7  37131,0  611190,7  2060,1 
1992  307925,8  1486,3  62292,6  644784,8  2053,5 
1993  316357,9  1490,4  57902,0  672410,7  2055,9 
1994  334546,5  1678,3  62459,9  703297,4  2311,4 
1995  335884,7  1607,8  64779,6  735053,6  2210,8 
1996  316131,9  1694,9  63007,8  763546,8  2333,4 
1997  291121,2  1738,2  56346,0  784040,2  2395,7 
1998  299129,3  1808,7  63906,2  811131,7  2495,9 
1999  323520,0  1879,9  65992,3  839037,1  2597,3 
2000  359488,0  1929,4  68123,0  867762,9  2668,9 
2001  363647,0  2014,4  70779,0  897795,9  2793,7 
2002  385749,0  2053,2  94065,0  949704,7  2854,7 
2003  392911,0  2293,2  107098,0  1012209,1  3196,7 
2004  462846,0  2463,9  115144,0  1079824,6  3443,5 
2005  493388,0  2784,8  127611,0  1156732,2  3902,0 
2006  533110,0  2896,0  140891,0  1243308,5  4084,0 
2007  598774,2  2978,7  129904,0  1314832,7  4227,7 
2008  620627,4  3078,3  117973,0  1371067,4  4397,2 
Sources: World Bank data set and Centre of Statiscal Office Syria. Physical and Human Capital  
author’s calculation as described in text. 
 
 